T he theory of purchasing power parity (PPP) states that the rate of exchange between two currencies is determined by the price levels in the two economies. In other words, the prices of a basket of similar goods and services in two countries should be equal when converted to a common currency. To the extent that the prices are not equalised, the exchange rate is said to be misaligned.
The Economist (26 August 1995, p. 70 ) provides a good analogy on exchange-rate misalignments: "Suppose a man climbs five feet up a sea wall, then climbs down 12 feet. Whether he drowns or not depends upon how high above sea-level he was when he started. The same problem arises in deciding whether currencies are under-or overvalued."
In recent years, research into the accuracy of the Big Mac Index as a measure of PPP between countries has generally concluded that the index performs just as well as, if not better than, most indices used in tests of PPP.' In fact, Ong (1997) The Malaysian ringgit, Singaporean dollar and Thai baht were undervalued by about 45%, 15% and 30% respectively. ' Meanwhile, the Indonesian rupiah was undervalued by 24% and the Philippines peso by 39%.' This is in line with earlier findings that ASEAN currencies have consistently been undervalued against the $US over the past decade.' The proposed devaluation of the US Big Mac price would have indeed landed the index in hot soup, as it would have instantly presented these developing country currencies as being substantially and uncharacteristically overvalued by approximately 60% to 90%.' At that point, only a major devaluation of these currencies could redeem the hamburger standard.
Events in ASEAN currency markets in the weeks leading up to September 1997 left the burger-sceptics choking on humble pie and further boosted the stock of burgemomics in the financial markets.
Many reasons and recriminations have been offered for the depreciation of these currencies, and the unexpectedness and viciousness with which it happened: speculative attacks led by the international financier George Soros; excessive foreign debt levels from using foreign funds to finance high levels of economic expansion; increasingly unsustainable current account deficits caused by surging imports; high and constantly-rising capital inflows. In hindsight, a Molotov cocktail just waiting to explode. However, as any avid burgerette knows, these currencies were already ripe for the picking when the announcement of the US Big Mac price cut was made.
The recent experience with the ASEAN currencies bears testimony to the versatility of the Big Mac Index as a pricing model for foreign exchange. The index suggested that the currencies needed to fall dramatically to restore parity, and tumble they did. Up to 3 September 1997, the baht had plunged 26% against the $US since April, the ringgit had depreciated 12%, and the peso and the rupiah had fallen 14% and 18%, respectively. Found guilty by association, the Singaporean dollar lost 5%.
The domino effects of these devaluations higher interest payments on foreign debt, higher interest costs of financing investments in real assets and the impending economic slowdown, higher import prices and subsequent inflation -were a recipe for further problems. Based on the Big Mac Index, further currency devaluations were imminent. At that stage, only the very brave would have bet against these currencies being sliced up further in the coming months.
6 And they would have lost heavily on that bet. By the end of January 1998, the rupiah had experienced a 159% meltdown from its April 1997 value, the baht and the ringgit were almost at parity, having lost 72% and 56% respectively against the $US, and the peso was down 4 7%. Caught up in the region's turmoil 
where Pct is the domestic currency price of a Big Mac in country c in year t; P*t is the price in $US of a Big Mac in the US; and Set is the spot exchange rate, defined as the domestic currency cost of $US1. Accordingly, Pct I P*t is the Big Mac PPP. A currency is said to be overvalued if rct equals zero. The percentage deviation from parity is approximately fct X 100. despite its strong economic fundamentals, Singapore's dollar had fallen 18% over that period.
If the sceptics need further convincing, one should point out that in the years leading to the Mexican peso getting its just deserts in 1995, the Big Mac Index had indicated the peso to be overvalued. The financial community should pay closer attention the next time Mr Soros orders a Big Mac to go.
NOTES
See Click (1996 ), Cumby (1996 , Ong (1997) and Pakko and Pollard (1996) .
2 See Figure 1 3 I am grateful to Grace Dharmawan and Princeton Tan for providing the Big Mac prices for Indonesia and the Philippines respectively. The corresponding exchange rates are obtained from The Economist.
4 Ong ( 1997) shows that the Malaysian ringgit, Singaporean dollar and Thai baht were, on average, respectively undervalued by approximately 53%, 26% and 19% against the US dollar over the 1986-94 period.
5 Ong (1997) demonstrates that the undervaluation of developing economy cmTencies can be attributed largely to the productivity bias hypothesis or the Balassa-Samuelson effect. This hypothesis states that since richer countries have a greater productivity advantage in traded goods relative to non-traded goods, the relative price of non-traded goods will be higher in those countries. The currencies of richer countries will thus appear overvalued in PPP terms, because non-traded goods enter into the calculation of PPP but not the exchange rate.
6 Although it is highly unlikely that the Singaporean dollar will devalue by another 85% to restore Big Mac PPP, further devaluations are not unlikely given its position as Malaysia's secondlargest trade and investment partner.
